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STRATEGIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LITIGATION, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, AND
THE ATTENUATION OF FREE SPEECH: LESSONS
FROM THE SCHWARZENEGGER BOBBLEHEAD
DOLL WAR (AND PEACE)
William T. Gallagher*
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY THE BOBBLEHEADS SHOULD HAVE
PREVAILED-AND WHY IT MATTERS
The "right of publicity" is an unusual, relatively under-
developed, and controversial form of state-law created intel-
lectual property that protects against the unauthorized ap-
propriation of one's likeness, image or identity.' Even in Cali-
fornia, with its prominent entertainment and celebrity
industries,' the right of publicity has many vague and uncer-
tain contours and its scope remains undefined In particular,
one issue that remains unclear in California (and in most
other jurisdictions that recognize rights of publicity) is the
proper balance between rights of publicity and First Amend-
ment rights of free speech and expression.3 This issue was
* Partner, Townsend and Townsend and Crew LLP. Lecturer in Law and Soci-
ology, Santa Clara University; Adjunct Professor of Law, Golden Gate Univer-
sity School of Law. J.D. UCLA School of Law; Ph.D. U.C. Berkeley, Boalt Hall
School of Law (Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program); M.A. University of
Chicago; B.A. U.C. Berkeley. Mr. Gallagher served as lead defense counsel in
the litigation that is the subject of this symposium. The author benefited from
discussions on the issues raised in this article with Shubha Ghosh, Tyler Ochoa,
Gia Cincone, Rob McFarlane, and Tae Kim. All opinions expressed in this arti-
cle are his own.
1. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY (2d ed. 2003).
2. Entertainers and other celebrities are not the only ones with rights of
publicity, but they are certainly more likely to assert these rights in litigation
than non-public figures.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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squarely and dramatically raised by the ODM defendants' 4
sale of an unauthorized bobblehead doll incorporating the
likeness of Arnold Schwarzenegger, who is both a Hollywood
movie star and, most recently, the governor of California.5
The ODM defendants claimed that the sale of this doll was
protected as expressive speech under the First Amendment,
particularly since the doll commented on a political figure,
and therefore its sale did not violate the plaintiffs right of
publicity.! This case also specifically raised the question of
whether California's statutory. and common law rights of pub-
licity permit a sitting politician to stop the sale of an item-
here, a bobblehead doll-that appropriates the politician's
image to create a playful caricature, parody, or satire. Indeed,
one of the reasons that the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll
litigation garnered so much worldwide publicity is precisely
because Schwarzenegger has two separate, but related, per-
sonas: not just "movie star" but also "governor." And it was
virtually unprecedented for a sitting politician to sue in order
to control the use of his or her image in similar circum-
stances.7 The ODM defendants sold an entire series of bob-
bleheads depicting both living and deceased politicians; yet
they had never previously been subject to legal threats or
proceedings to prevent the sales of these dolls.8 In fact, as
many news reports gleefully explained the Bosleys had pre-
viously sent copies of dolls to several politicians who appar-
ently appreciated (or, perhaps, acquiesced to) having their
likenesses made into a bobblehead doll.9 Some legal commen-
4. This article refers to defendants Todd and Toby Bosley and their com-
pany, Ohio Discount Merchandise, Inc. collectively as the "ODM defendants."
The two lawsuits filed against these defendants are referred to as the "ODM
litigation" or the "ODM case." The first case was filed in state court by plaintiff
Oak Productions, Inc. ("Oak Productions"), which is a licensing company estab-
lished to promote the Schwarzenegger image, alleging right of publicity and re-
lated claims. The second was filed in federal court by plaintiff Fitness Publica-
tions, Inc. ("Fitness") after defendants removed the case to federal court. The
Fitness complaint alleged copyright infringement relating to photographic im-
ages used on the packaging for ODM's Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll. See
The Schwarzenegger Bobbehead Case: Introduction and Statement of Facts, 45
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 548 (2005).
5. See id at 547-48.
6. Id. at 554.
7. See, e.g., McCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 4:25-4:26, pp. 4-36 to 4-40 (noting
that litigation to enforce alleged rights of publicity by politicians is rare).
8. Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 4, at 550-51.
9. Id. at 547, n.1.
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tators offered as an explanation the possibility that politi-
cians were reluctant to sue and thus appear to be humorless
or soft-skinned. ° Yet it is equally plausible that politicians
are aware that the sale of such products is likely fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment, particularly when the subject
being depicted is a political figure.
This article argues that the ODM defendants' First
Amendment defense should have prevailed had the suit ad-
vanced to trial, although this outcome was by no means cer-
tain, especially given the ambiguities in the right of publicity
law in California. The article further contends that plaintiffs
theory of the case was overbroad and legally unsupportable
because it presumed that plaintiff had an almost absolute
right to control the use of the Schwarzenegger image, at least
when that image is used on any product." That broad claim,
however, is too simplistic and should have been rejected by
the courts. Just as with any other form of intellectual prop-
erty, the right of publicity is a limited right.2 The primary
justification for the right of publicity is to permit the owner of
the rights to control uses of an image or likeness that detract
from the ability to derive economic value from such use."
Where an expressive and creative appropriation of a celebrity
image constitutes caricature, parody, or satire, as in the
10. See, e.g., John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit Against Bobblehead
Maker, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A16 (quoting UCLA Law Professor Eugene
Volokh, who suggested that politicians rarely file right of publicity lawsuits be-
cause of concerns that such litigation might make them look humorless to their
constituents); see also Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a
Right of Publicity "Wheel" Spun Out of Control, 45 KAN. L. REV. 329, 340 at
n.67 (1997) (noting that there are few cases that deal with the scope of the right
of publicity for political figures and opining that this may be because politicians
may simply not bring lawsuits to protect rights of publicity because they as-
sume they may not have strong rights, or might be too busy to sue).
11. Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 4, at 553, n.39.
12. See, e.g., JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, § 1.01[21, n.16.1 (2004)
and accompanying text (discussing rights of publicity as "limited property
rights"); see also id. § 1.08 (analyzing two models of intellectual property law as
limited rights). The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003), discussed some of the constitutional limitations on intellec-
tual property law, specifically, copyright law.
13. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001) (discussing the right of publicity as primarily an economic right); see also
Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 97 (1994) (discussing economic justifications for rights of public-
ity).
5832005
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Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll example, there can be no le-
gitimate argument that the right of publicity has been vio-
lated because there is little possibility that the rights-owner's
ability to derive economic value from the likeness or image
has been lessened. Moreover, where the caricature, parody,
or satire involves a politician, First Amendment rights to
creative free expression should properly override any claimed
right of publicity except in the most limited circumstances,
such as where the celebrity image is used as an advertise-
ment or in other circumstances that create confusion as to
sponsorship or affiliation.
The Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll case settled before
the intriguing issues it raised could be analyzed by the
courts. 4 At one level this settlement is unremarkable, since
most civil litigation settles well before full adjudication and
judgment. 5 But the settlement in this case raised troubling
issues about the ability of a powerful owner of rights of pub-
licity to over-enforce and over-protect those rights through
the use of strategic litigation, especially since the publicity
rights at issue were those of a celebrity-politician. Scholars
have warned how the over-protection of various intellectual
property rights by court decisions can chill expressive speech
or result in the diminution of the public domain.16 But there
is an additional threat that scholars are only just beginning
to explore: how the private enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights in the pre-litigation and pre-judgment contexts
can potentially over-broaden the scope of intellectual property
owners' rights.' One lesson from the Schwarzenegger bob-
blehead doll war is that a plaintiffs aggressive legal strategy
in this litigation permitted it to over-enforce tenuous rights of
publicity in circumstances where the courts should have (and,
I believe, would have) determined that defendants' activities
were privileged. The troubling result is that a powerful ce-
14. Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 4, at 547, n.3.
15. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) for a general overview on the em-
pirical literature on the topic of pretrial civil litigation outcomes, including the
fact that the vast majority of civil lawsuits settle before trial or adjudication on
the merits. See also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle:" Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN L. REV. 1339 (1994).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See id
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lebrity and politician was able to censor expressive activity-
the sale of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll with an as-
sault rifle-that was apparently deemed objectionable. That
is exactly the circumstance where a court should find that
First Amendment protection most strongly applies. This sug-
gests that courts should take a stronger stance to clarify and
articulate the limitations and defenses to the right of public-
ity in California and elsewhere to give full effect not just to
the rights of owners of the right of publicity, who often are
powerful corporate entities, but also to defendants targeted
by right of publicity claims. The latter are susceptible to
threats of litigation because the costs and uncertainties of an
infringement lawsuitmake settlement of even objectively
meritless or weak legal claims more likely (and less burden-
some) than pursuing a vigorous legal defense.
Part II of this article analyzes the "transformative" test
set forth by the California Supreme Court in two recent cases
to determine when the First Amendment trumps California
rights of publicity. 8 The article argues that under this
framework, the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll and its ac-
companying packaging should have easily been found to be
transformative and therefore protected expression that does
not violate California's statutory or common law rights of
publicity. Part III briefly analyzes the copyright issues raised
by the Fitness plaintiffs claims that the ODM defendants' use
of two Schwarzenegger photographs on the bobblehead doll
packaging constituted copyright infringement. 9 It concludes
that the use of these images should have been found by the
courts to constitute "fair use" under 17 U.S.C. section 107.20
Lastly, in Part IV, the article concludes that plaintiffs strate-
gic use of litigation and threats of litigation produced a set-
tlement in this case that, while acceptable to both sides in the
litigation, permitted plaintiff to squelch expressive speech
that it did not like. That result, the article argues, is the
diminution of free expression that creatively incorporates and
manipulates the celebrity image for purposes of social com-
mentary and entertainment. The ODM litigation and settle-
ment is thus an important example of the harm that can re-
18. See discussion infra Part II.
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) sets forth the statutory basis for a defense of "fair
use" under the U.S. copyright statute.
2005 585
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sult from over-enforcement of claimed intellectual property
rights-here, the right of publicity-in arenas of private en-
forcement outside the courts.
II. BOBBLEHEADS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The most significant and dramatic issue posed by the
ODM litigation was whether the sale of the Schwarzenegger
bobblehead doll fell squarely within the rights of the ODM de-
fendants to appropriate a celebrity-politician's likeness as a
form of expression protected under the First Amendment or
violated plaintiffs rights of publicity under California law. In
this case, the tension between these two rights should have
been examined in light of two recent controlling California
Supreme Court decisions, and resolved strongly in favor of
the ODM defendants.
A. The "Transformative" Test for Determining When the
First Amendment Trumps the California Right of Publicity
In two recent unanimous decisions, the California Su-
preme Court articulated a new test to determine when the
right of publicity under California law must yield to the First
Amendment right of free expression. First, in Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc.,1 the court introduced the
"transformative" test and applied it in the context of Califor-
nia's statutory right of publicity as it pertains to deceased ce-
lebrities.22 It held that the works in question, an artist's ren-
dering of the comedy team The Three Stooges on lithographs
and silk-screened T-shirts, did not warrant First Amendment
protection because the depiction used of these deceased celeb-
rities on these products was not sufficiently "transformative"
to meet the requisite threshold for First Amendment protec-
tion against a right of publicity claim. Only two years later,
in Winter v. DC Comics,3 the court reached the opposite con-
clusion, finding that a comic book series that depicted the
likenesses of two musicians warranted full First Amendment
protection.24 No other California court has decided a case un-
21. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
22. The statute at issue was California Civil Code section 990 (since renum-
bered as California Civil Code section 3344.1). CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (Deering
1984).
23. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
24. Since these musicians are very much alive, the DC Comics court inter-
Vol: 45586
STRATEGIC IP LITIGATION
der California's new test, although one Sixth Circuit court
has applied a version of it.2" These two cases, therefore, set
forth the guidelines and the controlling California law as to
when an expressive work will be considered sufficiently trans-
formative to trump the right of publicity in a particular case.
And while these cases are not without ambiguities, an appli-
cation of the transformative test to both the Schwarzenegger
bobblehead doll and its packaging reveals that both should be
protected under the First Amendment against a right of pub-
licity claim in California.
1. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc.
The plaintiff in Comedy III Productions, a corporation
that owns various intellectual property rights relating to the
long-deceased vaudeville and comedy act known as The Three
Stooges, sued an individual artist, Gary Saderup, and his
business corporation under California's right of publicity
statute pertaining to deceased celebrities, California Civil
Code section 990.26 The statute proscribes the unauthorized
commercial use of a deceased celebrity's likeness or image.27
Comedy III Productions sought damages and a permanent in-
junction to prevent Saderup from selling lithographs and T-
shirts that reproduced an original charcoal drawing Saderup
created depicting the likenesses of The Three Stooges. 8
Both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal ruled in
favor of Comedy III Productions on stipulated facts.29 On ap-
peal, Saderup raised two issues. First, he argued that Civil
Code section 990 did not apply to his use of the Stooges' like-
ness on his lithographs and T-shirts. Saderup contended that
section 990 proscribed only what has traditionally been called
"commercial uses" of a celebrity image, which, he argued were
limited to instances where the image was used to sell or so-
preted the California right of publicity statute that applied to living individuals,
section 3344 of the California Civil Code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1984).
25. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (apply-
ing several distinct tests, including the "transformative" test articulated in
Comedy III Productions, holding that depiction of golfer Tiger Woods on com-
memorative lithographs did not violate Wood's right of publicity). Id.
26. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 800-01.
27. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990.
28. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 800-01.
29. Id.
2005 587
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licit the sale of products or services." Since the images on
Saderup's lithographs and T-shirts constituted the products
themselves, as opposed to being used to sell other products,
Saderup contended that section 990 did not apply.3' The court
rejected this statutory interpretation argument. It stated
that section 990 prohibited the use of a celebrity likeness .' in
any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of,
products, merchandise, goods, or services . ,,,." Thus, the
court concluded, Saderup's products clearly came within the
purview of section 990 because the statute applied to the use
of a celebrity image "either (1) 'on or in' a product, or (2) in
'advertising or selling' a product."33  The court determined
that Saderup's interpretation would improperly ignore (sec-
tion 990's application to use of a celebrity image on or in a
product, and therefore rejected it.34
Saderup's second argument, and perhaps most important
to the analysis of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead, was that
enjoining the sale of his artwork and products violated his
First Amendment right of free speech and expression.35 The
court admitted that this constitutional argument raised "a
difficult issue" as to the proper balance between First
Amendment principles and the scope of California's right of
publicity.36
In deciding the constitutional issue, the court began by
reaffirming a number of core First Amendment principles
that guided its analysis. First, the lithographs and T-shirts
depicting The Three Stooges were not mere advertisements
but rather constituted expressive works of non-commercial
speech entitled to full First Amendment protection even if
these products were sold.37 Second, the fact that Saderup's
30. Id. at 801.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(a)).
33. Id. at 802.
34. Id.
35. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 802.
36. Id.
37. Id. "Saderup's portraits of The Three Stooges are expressive works and
not an advertisement for or endorsement of a product. Although his work was
done for financial gain. . . [a]n expressive activity does not lose its constitu-
tional protection because it is undertaken for profit. . . ." Id. (internal brackets
and citation omitted).
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art was made for purposes of entertainment," was non-verbal
expression,3 9 and may convey no particular discernable mes-
sage" similarly did not lessen its constitutional protection.
Third, the fact that Saderup's art appeared on "nontradi-
tional" media, likewise, did not diminish its First Amendment
protection.4
The court also highlighted what it believed was the sub-
stantial value created by the creative cultural appropriation
of celebrity images in our celebrity-obsessed modern world.
Such creative work, the court argued, "can be an important
avenue of individual expression."42 The court recognized that
overly strong enforcement of the right of publicity may
threaten such creative expression, and it stated that the right
of publicity must not be used as a "shield to ward off carica-
tures, parody, and satire."43 The court reiterated this princi-
ple in several variations:
* "[T]he right of publicity cannot, consistent with
the First Amendment, be a right to control the ce-
lebrity's image by censoring disagreeable portray-
als.""
* "[T]he right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and
make other expressive uses of the celebrity image
must be given broad scope."45
" "What the right of publicity holder possesses is not
a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others
from misappropriating the economic value gener-
38. Id. at 804 ("Nor do Saderup's creations lose their constitutional protec-
tions because they are for purposes of entertaining rather than informing.").
39. Id. ("Nor does the fact that expression takes a form of nonverbal, visual
representation remove it from the ambit of First Amendment protection.").
40. Id. ("[A] work of art is protected by the First Amendment even if it con-
veys no discernable message . . ").
41. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804 ("Nor does the fact that Saderup's art
appears in large part on a less conventional avenue of communications, T-
shirts, result in reduced First Amendment protection .... First Amendment
doctrine does not disfavor nontraditional media of expression.").
42. Id at 803.
43. Id. (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460
(Cal. 1979)). The court also noted that an overly strong application of the right
of publicity threatened to give celebrities greater ability to censor "unflattering
commentary" about them than permitted under defamation law, which would
make actionable only statements or expressions about public figures that are
made with actual malice. Id.
44. Id. at 807.
45. Id.
2005 589
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ated by the celebrity's fame through the merchan-
dising of the [celebrity's image or likeness]."46
Nevertheless, after affirming the substantial First
Amendment protection properly accorded noncommercial
speech commenting on celebrities, the court also recognized
society's strong interests in encouraging the types of creative
efforts that produce celebrities. Whether acknowledged as a
natural property (or moral) right or as the type of economic
incentive that encourages people to make the creative effort
to become celebrities in the first place, the court held that so-
ciety and the California legislature had determined that the
owners of rights of publicity have a legitimate and significant
interest in exploiting the commercial value of their celebrity
image."
To properly balance these competing interests between
rights of free expression and of publicity, the court adopted a
threshold for determining when First Amendment protection
would prevail: the transformative test.4 8  As the court ex-
plained, "[t]his inquiry into whether a work is 'transforma-
tive' appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judi-
cial attempt to square the right of publicity with the First
Amendment." 9
Somewhat confusingly, the court then articulated a num-
ber of inquiries related to determining whether a work is
transformative or not:
50
* Does it do no more than appropriate the economic
value of the celebrity image?5
* Is it a mere "literal depiction or imitation of a ce-
lebrity?""
* Is the celebrity likeness one of the "raw materials
from which an original work is synthesized" or is
46. Id.
47. Comedy lII Prods., 21 P.3d at 805.
48. Id. at 808.
49. Id
50. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40
Hous. L. REV. 903 (2004). Volokh makes the very important observation that
the court's various statements of its transformative test are not coherent and do
not yield the same result when applied to particular forms of expression. See id.
at 916-17. As I argue below, the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll and packag-
ing should easily pass the transformative test under any of its iterations by the
court in Comedy IIIProductions. See discussion infra Part II.B.
51. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 806.
52. Id. at 808.
Vol: 45590
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it "the very sum and substance of the work?"53
* Is the expressive work "so transformed that it has
become primarily the defendant's own expression
rather than the celebrity's likeness.?"'
* Is the expressive work a "merely trivial variation"
of the celebrity likeness rather than "something
recognizably [the artist's] own?"
55
Applying the transformative test to Saderup's work, the
court determined without much analysis that there was "no
significant transformative or creative contribution. [Sad-
erup's] undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to the
overall goal of creating literal, conventional depictions of The
Three Stooges so as to exploit their fame."56 The court thus
held that Saderup's First Amendment defense must fail.5
2. Winter v. DC Comics
Within two years of deciding Comedy IIIProductions, the
California Supreme Court in Winter v. DC Comics,58 revisited
the issue of the scope of California's right of publicity in the
context of a First Amendment challenge. In Winter, as in
Comedy III Productions, the court applied its transformative
test, this time to decide whether a comic book series that used
the likenesses of two musician brothers violated California's
right of publicity statute pertaining to living individuals.
The comic book series at issue in Winter contained a fanciful
and strange narrative; it depicted brothers Johnny and Edgar
Winter-very thinly veiled as "Johnny and Edgar Autumn"-
as "villainous half-worm, half-human offspring born from the
rape of their mother by a supernatural worm creature."' The
Autumn brothers were depicted as long-haired albinos (like
the Winter brothers) with tentacles coming from their chests,
who decapitated livestock and ate the brains of pigs with
whom they fornicated.61 Perhaps not surprisingly,62 the Win-
53. Id. at 809.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 810.
56. Id. at 811.
57. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 811.
58. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1984).
60. Winter, 69 P.3d at 476.
61. See id; see also Mike McKee, THE RECORDER, June 3, 2003, p. 2.
62. All artistic and legal merit aside, a depiction like the Autumn brothers
2005
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ter brothers sued, claiming the comic book portrayal of them
as "vile, depraved, stupid, cowardly, subhuman individuals
who engage in wanton acts of violence and bestiality for
pleasure"' wrongfully appropriated their names and like-
nesses in violation of their right of publicity under California
law.'
The Supreme Court, however, found that application of
the transformative test was "not difficult" and, in a brief
eleven-page opinion, found that the DC Comics' depictions of
the Winter brothers were clearly transformative and there-
fore fully protected speech. 5 The court determined that the
comic book depiction of the brothers was decidedly not literal.
Rather, the court reasoned, the brothers' images were dis-
torted "for purposes of lampoon, parody, or caricature."'
Such a depiction, the court continued, was unlikely to consti-
tute a substitute for conventional portrayals of the celebri-
ties' 7-something the court in Comedy III Productions
stressed was reserved to the right of publicity owner. The
court reasoned, "the comic books are no less protected because
they provide humorous rather than serious commentary.""8
Thus, the California Supreme Court's test has been ap-
plied to two quite different examples of expressive work to
date, leaving significant questions as to how this test will ap-
ply to works that are not as arguably literal depictions of ce-
lebrities as those by Saderup in Comedy IIInor as wildly dis-
torted as the half-man, half-worm depictions in DC Comics.
Nevertheless, the court's test should have been relatively
easy to apply to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll case
(had the case not settled) and the conclusion should have
been that the doll is clearly transformative and thus fully
protected by the First Amendment.
surely constitutes "fighting words."
63. Winter, 69 P.3d at 476
64. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
65, Id. at 479-80.
66, Id. at 479.
67. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
68. Id.
Vol: 45
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B. The Transformative Test Applied: Why the
Sch warzenegger Bobblehead Doll Is Like a Three-
Dimensional Political Cartoon
A proper analysis of whether the Schwarzenegger bob-
blehead doll and packaging is protected expression under the
First Amendment entails applying the transformative test
developed by the California Supreme Court in Comedy III
Productions and DC Comics.69 It is certainly possible that the
ODM case would have been decided under Ninth Circuit
precedent interpreting California's right of publicity statute' °
rather than under the California Supreme Court's new trans-
formative test.7' But a federal district court should have
properly deferred to the California Supreme Court when de-
ciding state law issues under the statute, particularly since
the California Supreme Court's recent rulings in Comedy III
Productions and DC Comics indicate that it has its own vision
of how the statute is to be applied under California law.
Moreover, a federal district court applying California law
should have determined that both the Schwarzenegger bob-
blehead doll and its packaging were both transformative and,
therefore, fully protected expression under the First Amend-
ment.
1. The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Doll Is
Transformative
The Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll at issue in the ODM
litigation features a grinning visage of Arnold Schwarzeneg-
69. See, e.g., Assurance Co. of Am. v. Wall & Assocs. LLC of Olympia, 379
F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[w]hen interpreting state law, federal courts are
bound by decisions of the state's highest court") (citation omitted); see also
Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001)
(federal court is bound by decisions of California Supreme Court when inter-
preting a California statute). It is also possible, of course, that a federal court
would determine that a case involving a clash between the First Amendment
and a state right of publicity is not purely an issue of state law and thus would
not require it to defer to a state court's determination of the scope of First
Amendment protection afforded by the right of publicity.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1984).
71. For example, in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180,
1184 at n.2 (9th Cir. 2001), a California case decided just months after Comedy
III Productions, the court cited Comedy III Productions in a single footnote, but
did not analyze and did not apply the transformative test in holding that the
unauthorized use of an altered photograph of actor Dustin Hoffman in a maga-
zine was protected under the First Amendment against Hoffman's right of pub-
licity claim.
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ger outfitted in a suit and tie, wearing a bandolier of bullets,
and brandishing an assault rifle. 72 The doll's head is dispro-
portionately large compared to its body, and it is connected to
the doll torso by a spring mechanism. This creates the classic
"bobble" effect that is characteristic of this type of doll, as the
head bounces or bobbles upon movement or touch. The doll is
amusing. The doll is also multivocal in that it cleverly juxta-
poses design elements to communicate multiple messages
about Schwarzenegger, including his dual personas as celeb-
rity and politician, and about the phenomenon of celebrity-
politicians itself in our celebrity-obsessed society. But is the
Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll "transformative?" Under
the test applied in Comedy III Productions and DC Comics,
the courts should have determined that it is.
a. The Bobblehead Is Not a Mere Literal Likeness
of the Celebrity Image
The Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll is not a mere literal
depiction or bare imitation of the Schwarzenegger likeness.
The doll certainly resembles Schwarzenegger enough to per-
mit the identification of the subject, but this is due not only to
the design of the doll head's visage but also to the inclusion of
design elements that are attributes of Schwarzenegger: the
"Governor" suit, which evokes73 Schwarzenegger's new iden-
tity as California's governor, and the rifle and bandolier,
which evoke Schwarzenegger's history and status as a Holly-
wood star who rose to prominence primarily in roles in action
movies that feature "shoot-em-up" scenes of fake violence.
The base of the doll also contains the name "Schwarzenegger"
spelled out so that the doll's identity cannot be mistaken.
The doll is not a literal depiction of the celebrity image
but rather a playful, yet powerful, interpretation. The head
72. See Appendix A, Photo One, infra p. 675.
73. The doll is at least a caricature, but the messages it creates are also
parody and possibly even satire. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice And
Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 546
(1998) (a useful discussion of definitions of parody and satire in the context of a
copyright infringement case).
74. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 50, at 908-09 ("First Amendment jurispru-
dence provides no support for distinguishing visual art depicting a person (a
bust or print) from literary or audiovisual works that use a person's name or
likeness") (arguing that right of publicity doctrines that distinguish between
supposed "high information content' works such as books or movies from 'low
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features a broad grinning visage, has been rendered dispro-
portionately large compared to the torso, and readily bobbles
when moved. But is this enough to constitute a transforma-
tive depiction of the celebrity likeness? It should be. The
very act of creating a bobblehead doll out of an individual's
likeness sufficiently distorts the likeness beyond a mere lit-
eral depiction to create the intended comic effect characteris-
tic of bobblehead dolls. A bobblehead doll thus caricatures
the individual likeness to create this effect. The caricature is
especially effective when "serious" celebrities, such as politi-
cians, are transformed as bobbleheads into slightly silly and
undignified figures with big grinning faces and bobbly heads.
Even the most serious and self-important celebrity or politi-
cian can be humbled by being made into a bobblehead doll.
Such distortion of the celebrity image for the purpose of cari-
cature and parodic effect should be sufficiently transforma-
tive to meet the threshold for First Amendment protection
announced in Comedy III Productions and DC Comics,"5 since,
almost by definition, parody76 or caricature results only when
a work depicts a likeness in such a way that the artist's ex-
pression predominates over the literal image of a celebrity
thus transforming the image to create a comical and critical
information content' works, a category into which some might place sculptures,
prints, and T-shirts" is inconsistent with the First Amendment); see also Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Amicus Curiae Bief of Seventy-Three Law Professors in
Support of Defendant/Appellee Jireh Publishing, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 389
(2000) (submitted in the case of ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915
(6th Cir. 2003)) (arguing forcefully that constitutional distinction between os-
tensible "commercial" and "newsworthy" or "traditional" media of expression is
based on an outdated and incorrect jurisprudence that should be rejected by
modem courts in right of publicity cases); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DuKE L.J. 383, 443 (1999) (arguing for
strong right of publicity but also recognizing the need for strong First Amend-
ment protection for appropriation of celebrity images on merchandise that is not
merely an advertisement).
75. Indeed these two cases, read together, strongly suggest that works of
parody are presumptively protected under the First Amendment, although the
proper analysis under these cases is not to identify precisely what type of work
is at issue-whether parody or satire or any other type of expression-but to
focus on whether the work is transformative.
76. Black's Law Dictionary defines parody as:
[a] transformative use of a well-known work for purposes of satirizing,
ridiculing, critiquing, or commenting on the original work. In constitu-
tional law, a parody is protected as free speech. In copyright law, a
work must meet the definition of parody and be a fair use of the copy-
righted material, or else it may constitute infringement.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (8th ed. 2004).
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effect. 7 This is in sharp contrast, for instance, to the bust of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. at issue in Martin Luther King,
Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod-
ucts, Inc.,"8 which the Georgia courts determined violated that
state's right of publicity. One of the difficulties with the bust
at issue in that case is that it was primarily a literal depiction
of its subject. In a mere literal depiction, such as this bust,
the primary message conveyed is the identity of who is being
depicted-it's Martin Luther King, Jr.-whereas the image of
Schwarzenegger on the bobblehead is merely the raw mate-
rial for the broad messages the doll conveys-satire, humor,
and social commentary. This fact weighs heavily in favor of a
finding that the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll is transfor-
mative.
b. The Bobblehead Constitutes a Creative and
Orginal Expression
As the court in Comedy III stressed, the context of an ex-
pressive work can be critical in rendering it transformative,
citing as examples the rather literal depictions by Andy War-
hol of celebrity likenesses such as Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth
Taylor, and Elvis Presley."9 The court concluded that these
77. Thus, I consider most if not all bobblehead dolls to be transformative
under the Comedy III Productions and DC Comics tests precisely because the
creation of the doll transfigures any literal image into a caricature and, depend-
ing on the context, a parody of the depicted individual. As a practical matter,
however, this argument would be especially difficult to make in court. As Pro-
fessor Tyler Ochoa has suggested in private conversation, a judge may be loath
to rule so broadly as to defeat the rights of publicity for any figure made into a
bobblehead. Such a ruling would affect numerous celebrities, both dead and
alive, who are subjects in the bobblehead doll industry. In the case of the
Schwarzenegger and other political bobbleheads, however, the fact that the
likenesses appropriated are those of politicians may be an "extra" element that
makes it easier to argue that such dolls are especially communicative and trans-
formative precisely because the distortion of a politician's image almost neces-
sarily constitutes some sort of parodic comment on that figure. Because the
Schwarzenegger doll presented the issue in a rarified context-where the image
depicted is that of someone who is simultaneously a celebrity and a politician-
any ruling upholding the ODM defendants' First Amendment defense would
likely have been made on narrow grounds that would not necessarily affect non-
politicians' rights of publicity.
78. 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
79. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 811. This is similar to the analysis of the
court in ETW Corp. v Jireh Publg, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), where the
court found that literal renderings of Tiger Woods and other golf legends on
lithographs was transformative in part because the lithographs used these im-
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works "convey a message that went beyond the commercial
exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic
social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity itself."
80
Similarly, in the ODM litigation, the context is the key to
concluding that the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll is trans-
formative. What is this context? In a word, it is the "Gover-
nator." The fact that Schwarzenegger is both a Hollywood ce-
lebrity and the governor of California is a substantial part of
the context that makes the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll
transformative. The fact that it is a politician's likeness or
image that is being used should enhance the transformative
nature of almost any work, short of one that merely uses the
image solely to sell an unrelated commercial product."'
In the ODM case, the Schwarzenegger likeness was not
being used to sell other products but was the product itself,
albeit in a creative expression of that image. The Schwar-
zenegger image was thus part of the "raw materials" or the
medium that the bobblehead doll's creators used to convey the
multivocal messages the doll communicated. This message
invariably comments, at least in part, on the Schwarzenegger
political image and persona even if it also simultaneously
comments on the Schwarzenegger Hollywood movie star per-
sona. The governor himself, after all, has certainly made ef-
fective use of his Hollywood tough-guy, "Terminator" image in
political life.8" Schwarzenegger, now the governor, has be-
come the "Governator," a play on words that evokes the dual
personas of the current Schwarzenegger image. This image is
also used extensively in political cartoons commenting on
Schwarzenegger's new status as a politician.88 It would be
ages and words to convey an important message about these athletes. Id. at
938.
80. Comedy lII Prods., 21 P.3d at 811.
81. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 4:23, pp. 4-31 (arguing that politi-
cians give up most of their rights of publicity upon entering public office).
What remains is largely the right to prevent the use of a politician's image for
advertising purposes, giving rise to a claim for false endorsement, which is not
at issue in the ODM case.
82. See, e.g., Peter Nicholas, Governor Criticizes Legislators as Girie-Men,
L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at B1 (discussing how the Governor told the crowd at
a political rally to "terminate" Democratic politicians who refused to support his
state budget).
83. See, e.g.,
http://politicalhumor.about.com/library/images/blarnoldpics.htm (last visited
Mar. 11, 2005) (site with collection of political cartoons, many of them using the
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disturbing for a court to hold that the right of publicity should
trump the ODM defendants' right to sell a doll that similarly
comments on the Schwarzenegger image. Such a decision
would also be incongruous because it would permit Schwar-
zenegger to monopolize his image as the "Governator" for
both political and private profit.'
The use of the Schwarzenegger image on the bobblehead
doll and packaging should be transformative precisely be-
cause this kind of speech concerning politicians should be
among the most protected speech under the First Amend-
ment, even if it is conveyed by whimsical commercial prod-
ucts. Thus, the use of the Schwarzenegger likeness on any
variety of other items, such as on the face of a Mickey Mouse
watch, on a political button, on a Halloween mask, or on a
punching bag, should also be transformative, so long as the
primary message, in context, is one of commentary on the ce-
lebrity-politician rather than merely an advertisement to buy
a product.85
Plaintiff in the ODM case would have undoubtedly dis-
agreed with such an analysis. The plaintiff may have insisted
that the use of a politician's image on products like dolls
should not be privileged by the First Amendment because
these products are not traditional media for the expression of
political ideas or newsworthy information but mere commer-
cial products subject to lessened First Amendment protection.
One observer, for example, argues that:
[clourts have routinely denied [F]irst [A]mendment im-
munity from Right of Publicity liability when unpermitted
use of identity is used even in 'messages' on T-shirts,
dishes, ashtrays, drinking mugs, and the like. This result
is usually reached on the basis that these are not the
"Terminator" or "Governator" names or images as part of their humorous com-
mentary on the Schwarzenegger phenomenon).
84. It is also likely unethical for a sitting politician to use his public image
as a politician for purely private gain.
85. This analysis suggests that the use of Schwarzenegger's likeness, or that
of any other politician's, on even cruder commercial products, such as toilet
seats, should also be viewed as transformative. This is contrary to the result
reached by the court in a case dealing with a non-politician, Johnny Carson.
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (up-
holding plaintiffs right of publicity claim to prevent use of phrase "Here's
Johnny," associated with plaintiff Johnny Carson, in connection with the sale of
portable toilets).
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usual media for social or political messages,
which are typically limited to such media as newspapers,
books, movies.
But this argument has several weaknesses. First, consis-
tent with contemporary free speech jurisprudence, 7 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions and DC
Comics rejected any distinction between supposed "tradi-
tional" and "nontraditional" media of expression when assess-
ing a First Amendment defense to right of publicity claims."
Indeed, the California Supreme Court made clear in develop-
ing its transformative test that it was not adopting any dis-
tinction between traditional and nontraditional expressive
media: "less conventional" media of expression, such as the T-
shirts at issue in Comedy III Productions, the court stressed,
are not subject to lesser protection than supposedly tradi-
tional media for the communication of ideas." This is consis-
tent with the approach of the Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons.90 In
holding that parody baseball cards depicting celebrity ball-
players did not violate rights of publicity, the court stated
that: "[t]he protections afforded by the First Amendment ...
have never been limited to newspapers and books.... Thus,
even if the trading cards are not a traditional medium of ex-
pression, they nonetheless contain protected speech."9
Moreover, the distinction between ostensible traditional
and nontraditional media of expression for socially significant
86. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.6, pp. 7-27. However, McCarthy himself
notes that the Comedy III Productions court rejected his analysis that "what is
crucial is the medium, not the message." Id. at n.10; see also Stephen Barnett,
Right of Pubhlicity Versus Free Speech in Advertising.: Counterpoints to Profes-
sor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593 (1996) (critiquing
McCarthy's position on rights of publicity and arguing for a strong fair use
standard).
87. See discussion supra note 74.
88. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804 ("First Amendment doctrine does not
disfavor nontraditional media of expression.").
89. See id.
90. See Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 969
(10th Cir. 1996).
91. Id. The Cardtoons court rejected plaintiffs argument that baseball
cards with parody images of ballplayers were mere commercial products subject
to lesser constitutional protection against a right of publicity claim; see also
ETW v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that the use of a
celebrity image on commemorative lithographs contained "substantial informa-
tional and creative content" privileged under the First Amendment against a
right of publicity claim).
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ideas is empirically and conceptually problematic. It assumes
without any historical or empirical evidence that products
other than books, newspapers, or movies have not played a
significant role as expressive media in American culture. But
much scholarship on our contemporary consumer culture
suggests that such artifacts play a potentially rich role in ar-
ticulating ideas, including complex political expressions."
Lastly, this reasoning is also unpersuasive because it largely
ignores that First Amendment protection is not limited to "so-
cial or political" expression: even expression for pure "enter-
tainment" purposes falls within its ambit.93 Any argument by
plaintiff that the Schwarzenegger bobblehead is a mere com-
mercial product unworthy of First Amendment protection be-
cause it is not a traditional medium of expression of ideas
should thus have been soundly rejected by the courts. 4
c. The Bobblehead Does Not Interfere with the
Economic Value of the Celebrity Likeness
The central justification for the right of publicity for the
California Supreme Court is the need to protect the celeb-
92. See, e.g, ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW (1998). There is an ex-
tensive body of scholarship demonstrating that commodity products may be sig-
nificant media for expression of substantial political beliefs and information.
93. See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804 (explaining that entertainment is
included in First Amendment protection).
94. It was also anticipated that to support its right of publicity claims plain-
tiff would have relied on the authority of several Ninth Circuit cases. See Mid-
dler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (sound-alike voice imitating
popular singer used in advertisement to sell cars may constitute misappropria-
tion of identify in violation of California common law right of publicity); Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (unauthorized use of singer's dis-
tinctive voice in commercial to sell snack products can violate California right of
publicity); Wendt v. Host Inter., Inc., 50 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (use of actors'
likenesses as characters they played on television show in order to advertise
airport bar may violate California right of publicity); White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (use of image in commercial advertising
that invokes celebrity's identity may violate California right of publicity). These
cases are potentially strong plaintiffs cases in other circumstances, but are all
inapposite in the ODM case because they deal with the unauthorized use of a
celebrity image or likeness for the purpose of advertising another product. That
is simply not the case in the ODM litigation, where the product at issue is the
appropriated likeness of Schwarzenegger on the doll itself. The image is not be-
ing used to sell another product, such as cars, snack food, consumer electronics,
or ab-cruncher exercise equipment. Moreover, none of these cases deal with a
political figure, which itself makes their precedential value to plaintiff problem-
atic in the ODM litigation.
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rity's ability to control the economic value derived from non-
transformative, conventional depictions of the celebrity like-
ness.95 As the court points out, expressions of the celebrity
likeness that are transformative, such as caricatures or paro-
dies, are unlikely to detract from the economic value of the ce-
lebrity image since such non-conventional depictions will be a
poor substitute for fans who want a literal image of the celeb-
rity to adorn their walls, T-shirts, coffee cups, or other prod-
ucts.96 This factor weighs heavily in favor of a finding that
the ODM doll is transformative. Under this analysis, the
Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll is not an adequate substi-
tute for more conventional images of Schwarzenegger because
it is so clearly a transformative and non-literal representation
of Schwarzenegger. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that a
Schwarzenegger fan would fail to purchase any of the author-
ized celebrity paraphernalia available containing the Schwar-
zenegger image simply because the ODM bobblehead doll is
also available. The authorized Schwarzenegger products
available to fans are typically more reverential in tone and do
not draw on the more complex and perhaps critical messages
created by the ODM doll's depiction of the Schwarzenegger
likeness. The courts should thus have found that the Schwar-
zenegger bobblehead doll would not likely affect the ability of
plaintiff to derive economic gain from the Schwarzenegger ce-
lebrity likeness.
2. The Bobblehead Doll Packaging Is Also
Transformative
The box in which the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll
was sold was also subject to plaintiffs right of publicity
claims.97 Plaintiffs original theory of the case was that the
doll and box both violated Schwarzenegger's right of public-
ity.9" The box has seven variously sized photographic images
95. See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808.
96. Id. ("[W]orks of parody or other distortions of the celebrity figure are
not, from the celebrity fan's viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional depic-
tions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celeb-
rity memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to protect.").
97. Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 4, at 554 and Appendix
A, Photos Two and Three, infra p. 676.
98. Id. at 553, n.39. After the case was removed to federal court, plaintiff
also claimed that two allegedly copyrighted images reproduced on the box also
constituted copyright infringement. Id. at 554.
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of Schwarzenegger.99 One picture depicts Schwarzenegger as
a young man during his professional bodybuilding years with
a partial picture of an American flag superimposed over his
torso. Another picture contains a partial profile of Schwar-
zenegger from a movie role. The remaining depictions are of
Schwarzenegger in his politician role, either taken during his
campaign for governor or at his inauguration. The box also
features text on the back, which describes various biographi-
cal details of Schwarzenegger's life. These photographic im-
ages and text form a collage that not only visually represents
the dual personas of Schwarzenegger, but also expressly tells
the story of Schwarzenegger's personal successes as profes-
sional bodybuilder, movie star, and politician. But is this box
transformative, or does it separately appropriate the Schwar-
zenegger likeness primarily in a literal fashion, adding little
of the creator's own expression, so as merely to commercially
exploit the celebrity image?
Arguably, the box is more problematic than the doll itself
under the transformative test. The box images by themselves
do not communicate caricature, parody, or satire, but convey
a more reverential and respectful message commemorating
highlights and achievements in Schwarzenegger's biography.
The box uses photographic images that are largely unaltered,
except for cropping of the pictures in places and the deletion
of color in one image.0 0 This would allow plaintiff to argue
that the photos are non-transformative, literal depictions that
do not warrant any First Amendment protection since they
merely use the celebrity image to sell the bobblehead doll and
not to express any transformative image or message. Yet,
such an argument would be weak for two reasons. First, the
fact that photographs are in themselves largely literal depic-
tions of the celebrity image is irrelevant, since the California
Supreme Court expressly declined to create a bright-line test
that would remove literal depictions from First Amendment
protection."" Even the most literal depictions of the celebrity
likeness, the court held, can be transformative, especially
when analyzed in context to discern the overall effect the art-
ist or creator has achieved in using the likeness in the work
99. See Appendix A, Photos Two and Three, infra p. 676.
100. Id.
101. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 811.
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as a whole. °2
Under this reasoning, the box is transformative. It pre-
sents a collage of images of Schwarzenegger's likeness with
text that tells the celebrity's story. Like the doll, the box
communicates a dominant message that is more than the
mere identification of who is being depicted. The message
that makes the doll so amusing is the Schwarzenegger story.
Even if the box is more reverential than parody, this alone
cannot remove it from First Amendment protection.
10 3
Moreover, the box images cannot be properly analyzed in
isolation. Part of the context for the box is the Schwarzeneg-
ger bobblehead doll itself. Indeed, the only evidence from the
ODM case is that the box was always depicted alongside an
image of the doll, whether on the ODM defendants' Web site
or in retail locations."M This makes sense, of course, since it is
the doll, rather than the box, that generated interest and
commentary, as evidenced by the amazing worldwide public-
ity generated by the sale of dolls.'0 ' It would be nonsensical to
argue, for example, that the box itself was the reason why
anyone purchased the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll. In
this context, the same arguments that strongly support the
conclusion that the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll is trans-
formative apply equally to the box as well. The box adds to
the messages the doll communicates, and these messages are
not simply to "buy this product."
In sum, the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll is transfor-
mative because it creatively appropriates Schwarzenegger's
image to comment on the Schwarzenegger phenomenon itself,
102. Id.
103. In this respect, the box images are similar to those of Tiger Woods and
other golf celebrities depicted on commemorative limited edition prints in ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Puhl'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). In ETW, the court held
that defendant's use of a literal likeness of Tiger Woods was protected under the
First Amendment against plaintiffs claim under Ohio's right of publicity. Al-
though the court applied several tests in reaching its decision, it also specifically
found that defendant's use was "transformative" under the test set forth in
Comedy III Productions. Id. at 938.
104. Because the case settled before the initiation of pretrial discovery and
before any substantial evidence was put forth before the court, this fact was not
documented. I am simply asserting that it is accurate, so the reader will have
to take that into account.
105. Also, it would be incredible to suggest that the box images in any way
could constitute an adequate substitute for conventional depictions of the celeb-
rity image. The box is a package for the doll, not a separate product of celebrity
memorabilia that any purchaser would want without the doll.
6032005
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and the doll's popularity derives primarily from the content of
the parodic (and other) messages it communicates, rather
than from its use of Schwarzenegger's image or likeness. As
such, there can be no serious argument that the bobblehead
deprives the plaintiff from any of the economic benefit the
right of publicity is intended to protect. The doll is best
analogized to a three-dimensional political cartoon about a
popular and controversial celebrity-politician who himself has
taken advantage of the political capital his celebrity status
provides. Accordingly, whether analyzed under California's
transformative test or under general First Amendment juris-
prudence (as exemplified in the Cardtoons and ETW cases),
the courts should have accorded the ODM Schwarzenegger
bobblehead the strongest protection against plaintiffs over-
reaching right of publicity claims.
III. THE COPYRIGHT FAIR USE ANALYSIS
Immediately after the ODM defendants removed the liti-
gation from state to federal court as part of their initial plead-
ing, the Oak Productions plaintiff, through third parties, 6
initiated a new lawsuit against the ODM defendants. 7 It al-
leged copyright infringement for the unauthorized use of two
photographic images of Schwarzenegger on the bobblehead
box and packaging. °8 Although this part of the case also set-
tled before an answer was filed, the ODM defendants took the
position that their use of these two copyrighted photographs
was also permitted under the copyright fair use doctrine.' 9
106. The litigation never proceeded to a stage where the relationship of the
new party, the Fitness plaintiff, to Oak Productions was formally identified
through discovery. However, the Fitness plaintiff is a Schwarzenegger-owned
company and was represented by Oak Productions' attorneys. And it was also
clear to defense counsel at the time that Oak Productions was directing the liti-
gation of Fitness as well, including directing it to acquire a copyright of yet an-
other party, Beacon Communications, LLC, for the sole purpose of asserting it
against the ODM defendants in retaliation for their removal of the initial litiga-
tion from state to federal court.
107. Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 4, at 554.
108. Id.
109. In its filed copyright complaint, the Fitness plaintiff did not sufficiently
allege ownership of valid copyrights as is required under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
(2000), and the case settled before all the alleged copyright registrations were
identified. However, counsel for the ODM defendants believe that each of these
two photos was registered for copyright protection as part of larger works and
not individually. As discussed below, this is one significant element of the fair
use analysis under factor three. See discussion infra note 110.
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The starting point for any analysis of whether the use of
two Schwarzenegger photographs on the ODM bobblehead
doll box constitutes copyright "fair use" under 17 U.S.C. § 107
is the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.'° In Campbell, the Supreme Court de-
termined that the rap music group 2 Live Crew's parody of
the Roy Orbison song "Pretty Woman" constituted copyright
fair use.1 ' The Supreme Court also clarified that all four fac-
tors set forth in section 107112 were to be analyzed in assessing
whether the use of a copyrighted work is fair use and that a
finding on no single factor alone would be determinative."3
The fair use analysis is thus a fact-specific determination that
courts must apply on a case-by-case basis, without the aid of
any bright-line test."4 But, as discussed below, the Supreme
Court did provide insight into how parodic works, such as the
Schwarzenegger bobblehead, are subject to strong protection
under the copyright fair use doctrine.
A. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first fair use inquiry considers "the purpose and
character of the use" made from the copyrighted work."'
Relevant factors are whether the use is purely commercial or
for nonprofit or educational purposes." "The central purpose
of this investigation," the Campbell court stated, is to deter-
mine "whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects'
of the original creation ... or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character ... [and]
whether and to what extent the new work is 'transforma-
110. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
111. Id. at 569.
112. 17 U.S.C. § 107 sets forth four factors to be analyzed in any fair use de-
termination:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
113. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
114. Id.
115. See Ochoa, supra note 73; see also Marlin H. Smith, The Limits of Copy-
right: Property, Parody, and the Public Domain, 42 DuKE L.J. 1233 (1993).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
117. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
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tive.""' This factor and the Supreme Court's language in
Campbell were relied upon by the California Supreme Court
in its Comedy III Productions decision, where the court devel-
oped the "transformative" test for First Amendment protec-
tion in the right of publicity context."9 Analysis of the first
fair use factor is thus similar to the application of the trans-
formative test. And, as in Comedy III Productions, determin-
ing that a work is a parody tends to weigh in favor of a find-
ing that the challenged use is protected expression under the
first fair use factor. As the Campbell court stated, "parody
has an obvious claim to transformative value."" Moreover,
works such as parody necessarily draw on or copy the original
work to a significant degree in order to achieve the effect of
parody, which can both refer to and comment on the original
work.' ' Even a work of parody, however, will not be entitled
to fair use protection under this factor where it is used merely
to advertise a product rather than to sell the work of parody
for its own sake. 2'
Under these general principles, the first fair use factor
should weigh strongly in favor of the ODM defendants. Al-
though the bobblehead box was sold commercially as packag-
ing for the doll, its purpose as communicating parody gives it
a strong claim for copyright fair use. The box, including the
two copyrighted photos, is thus transformative in that it su-
persedes the original work and adds substantial original ex-
pression by its clever juxtaposition of various photos of
Schwarzenegger in his bodybuilder, movie star, and governor
roles. The Fitness plaintiff certainly would have been ex-
pected to argue that the photos on the box are merely (or,
perhaps, primarily) used to sell another product, namely, the
doll, but such an argument is not convincing. As mentioned
above, it is simply not believable to suggest that it is the box
that drove the sale of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll.
The doll itself is what generated demand and worldwide pub-
licity. The box images and text themselves do not primarily
convey a message to buy the doll. Their message is more
118. Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted).
119. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal.
2001).
120. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
121. Id. at 580-81.
122. Id. at 585.
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multivocal, as part of the caricature, parody, and satire of the
doll. This factor thus weighs strongly in favor of a finding of
fair use.
B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor focuses on the "nature of the
copyrighted work," including whether the work is fictional
rather than factual or unpublished rather than published.'
This factor recognizes that copyright law typically has privi-
leged certain types of works as being "closer to the core of in-
tended copyright protection than others," which will weigh
against copying of such works under this factor."' However,
as the Campbell court stated, this factor may be of little help
when analyzing works of parody, since such works almost in-
variably copy known, published, and creative works."'
In the ODM case, the two photos at issue were appar-
ently published. Photographs are likely to be considered crea-
tive and expressive works. But, as in Campbell, these facts
do little to further the fair use analysis, since the box on
which the photos appear is part of a work of parody.
C Amount and Substantiality of Use
The third fair use factor analyzes "the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole." 26 The focus of this factor is on the reason-
ableness of the use made by a defendant given the purpose of
the use. 27 This factor incorporates both a quantitative and a
qualitative dimension, as a court should analyze not just how
much of a copyrighted work is copied but also how significant
the copied portion is to the copyrighted whole work. 2' The
Campbell court recognized that this factor can be particularly
challenging when analyzing works of parody, since, as the
court stated, "[p]arody's humor, or in any event its comment,
necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object
123. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
124. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
125. Id. "This fact[or], however, is not ... ever likely to help much in sepa-
rating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since paro-
dies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works." Id.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
127. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
128. Id. at 587.
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through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the tension be-
tween a known original and its parodic twin."'29 Although the
Campbell court was referring specifically to the rap song at
issue in that case, this principle certainly applies equally well
to parodic works that include the use of copyrighted photo-
graphs. The analysis then becomes how much of the photo-
graphic work has been used and how valuable the portion
used was when compared to the work as a whole, realizing
that the use must necessarily incorporate enough of the copy-
righted work to create the intended messages.
Here, this factor also strongly favors a fair use defense
for the two Schwarzenegger photographs on the ODM bobble-
head box. First, the use is reasonable. Neither picture at is-
sue on the box is a complete duplicate of the copyrighted
original. The image of Schwarzenegger as a bodybuilder 30 is
one picture from a collection of Schwarzenegger photographs
copyrighted as a whole. The picture used is cropped to show
only the torso, while an American flag image is superimposed
partly over the torso. Moreover, another image of Schwar-
zenegger, depicting him as a politician, is itself superimposed
and placed in the forefront of the bodybuilder photo. The ef-
fect is to visually convey the message of the two Schwar-
zenegger personas. The partial use of this bodybuilder photo
thus reinforces the messages that are conveyed both by the
box's other pictures and text and by the juxtaposition of this
image with the bobblehead doll itself.
The second photo at issue' is also a partial selection of a
larger photograph depicting a side shot of the face of Schwar-
zenegger playing a character from his movie End of Days.'32
This photo too is placed in the background on one side of the
box, and it has a small photo of the politician Schwarzenegger
superimposed over it at the bottom in the foreground. This
picture, altered to black-and-white, from the color original,
again conveys the messages of the Schwarzenegger story and
personas by creatively juxtaposing these photographic im-
ages. The partial use of the two copyrighted photos is no
more than is necessary to create the intended effect: the cari-
cature, parody, satire, and other messages conveyed to the
129. Id. at 588.
130. See Appendix A, Photo Two, infra p. 676.
131. See id.
132. END OF DAYS (1999). Armyan Bernstein and Boll Borden, producers.
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purchaser of the doll and box. The use of these two photos is
partial because neither photograph is used in its entirety.
Moreover, the copyright to the bodybuilder photo covers mul-
tiple photographs published in a book format, so the use of
this photo is even more limited compared to the copyrighted
work as a whole. It makes little sense to suggest that these
photos are qualitatively improper or that they take too much
of the heart of the original work since any photographic use in
a collage of this sort must copy enough of the original to con-
jure up the original subject.
D. Effect of Use on Market or Value of Copjrzghted Work
The last fair use factor focuses both on the actual market
harm done to the original copyrighted work 33 due to the de-
fendant's use and on the potential harm to the original that
would result from "unrestricted and widespread conduct of
the sort engaged in by defendant."" The analysis under this
factor "must take account not only of harm to the original but
also of harm to the market for derivative works."' In assess-
ing the potential for market harm generated by the defen-
dant's work, the fact that a work is transformative and a par-
ody tends to weigh heavily in favor of fair use-just as it does
in the other three factors-because such works are unlikely to
function as substitutes for the original copyrighted work.136
In the ODM case, this factor should heavily support the
finding of fair use. As part of a product that has strong ele-
ments of parody, the bobblehead doll box cannot seriously be
considered as a substitute for photographs of the Schwar-
zenegger image, whether it is the bodybuilder image or that
of the movie character. Here, the main function of the box is
to continue the expressive commentary on the Schwarzeneg-
ger phenomenon that the bobblehead doll also communicates.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
134. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (internal quotations omitted).
135. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
136. See id. at 591.
[W]hen ... the second use is transformative, market substitution is at
least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred. In-
deed, as to parody pure and simple, it is more likely that the new work
will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under
this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it. This is so because
the parody and the original usually serve different market functions.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Even if this communication is perceived as critical or objec-
tionable, that is not the type of harm that is cognizable under
this factor. Since this factor also supports a finding of fair
use, the courts accordingly should have rejected the Fitness
plaintiffs copyright infringement claim in its entirety.
IV. STRATEGIC IP LITIGATION, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, AND
CENSORSHIP
This article has thus far argued that settlement of the
ODM litigation silenced expressive activity that should prop-
erly have been fully privileged under the First Amendment
against plaintiffs claims. The settlement of this case is par-
ticularly troubling because by stopping the sales of the
Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll with a gun, the settlement
resulted in censorship of commentary about a prominent, in-
triguing, and controversial political figure, to which the right
of publicity should clearly yield. The ODM case is an example
of what I term strategic intellectual property litigation.1
37
Strategic intellectual property litigation refers to the use
by intellectual property owners (and potential plaintiffs) of
threats to sue and to the filing of lawsuits (regardless of
whether there is any intent or commitment to fully litigate a
case to a judgment in court) to give effect to ostensible intel-
lectual property rights, where the primary goal is not neces-
sarily to obtain a monetary award but to alter the behavior of
the threatened target (and actual or potential defendant). A
typical intended result is often to force the target to stop us-
ing the alleged intellectual property. Strategic intellectual
property litigation involves a continuum of practices engaged
in by intellectual property owners (and their attorneys), rang-
ing from sending "cease and desist" letters to targeted parties
to fully litigating a lawsuit to a judgment. Strategic intellec-
tual property litigation is a particularly salient feature of the
intellectual property legal landscape because the law requires
rights owners to enforce their claimed rights against unau-
thorized users or risk losing them entirely.'38 It is in this
137. The analysis of strategic intellectual property litigation is brief both due
to space constraints imposed by this symposium and also because the research
on this topic, of which the ODM case-study is one part, is both preliminary and
ongoing.
138. See, e.g., Cecilia Ogbu, I Put Up a Web Site About My Favorite Show
And All I Got Was This Lousy Cease-And-Desist Letter: The Intersection of Fan
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arena of everyday practice where intellectual property own-
ers' rights are asserted, resisted, negotiated, and, sometimes,
acquiesced to in settlement. Understanding how, why, under
what circumstances, and with what results these rights are
asserted may reveal much about the practical scope of intel-
lectual property rights.
How is the ODM case an example of strategic intellectual
property litigation? There can be little doubt that the ODM
litigation was primarily motivated by the plaintiffs desire-
or that of its client-to censor what it considered to be an ob-
jectionable portrait of Governor Schwarzenegger, rather than
to enforce ostensible rights of publicity. The ODM defendants
were told, after all, that the Sacramento gift shop owner who
sold the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll in her capitol shop
was informed by the aide of the Governor's wife39 that the
doll was unauthorized and should not be sold.14° This mes-
sage came shortly after both Ms. Shriver and her aide had
been in the shop and saw the doll."' Moreover, the most rea-
sonable inference to draw from the publicly announced
statement of the settlement of this matter-which indicated
that an authorized Schwarzenegger doll would be sold by the
ODM defendants in the future, but without a gun-is that it
was the gun that plaintiff found objectionable. Yet that "ad-
mission" should have been fatal to the ODM plaintiffs right
of publicity claims. The plaintiff and/or its client may con-
sider the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll unflattering or un-
dignified, but that is exactly the reason it should have been
protected as transformative and expressive speech. Under
the First Amendment, an artist should have "broad scope" to
"parody, lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the ce-
lebrity image. '  The right of publicity cannot properly be
used to censor depictions that a celebrity finds disagreeable
or distasteful.' But, as the public settlement statement of
the ODM case makes clear, that is precisely what happened.
There is other evidence, as well, that suggests that this
Sites, Internet Culture, And Copyzight Owners, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 279
(2003) (discussing practices of entertainment industry copyright holders to cen-
sor Internet activities by fans).
139. Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 4, at 552, n.38.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001).
143. Id.
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case was strategic intellectual property litigation. The initial
cease and desist letter sent by plaintiffs counsel, for instance,
was especially threatening in its tone and manifestly in-
tended to stop sales of the offending doll rather than to collect
licensing fees or other monetary damages." The letter
claimed broad rights to monopolize the use of Schwarzeneg-
ger's likeness or image on any commercial product; it threat-
ened substantial monetary damages (alleging that a "market
value" measure of damages for use of Schwarzenegger's image
would total "millions" of dollars); it demanded immediate
compliance (within forty-eight hours) with plaintiffs demands
to pay monetary damages and cease all sales of the bobble-
head doll and threatened a lawsuit if compliance was not
forthcoming in that time frame; and, it asserted that the let-
ter listing these demands was itself a "confidential legal no-
tice" protected by copyright and that any "republication" of
the letter in any medium, including on the Internet, would
subject the ODM defendants and anyone associated with
them to liability for copyright infringement. 1
45
Lastly, the recent introduction by one of the ODM defen-
dants, John Edgell, of a "Girlie-Man" Schwarzenegger bob-
blehead doll depicting the likeness of Schwarzenegger in a hot
pink dress and sporting high heels146 also reinforces the con-
clusion that plaintiff was not engaged merely in asserting le-
gitimate rights of publicity but also sought to control the
Schwarzenegger image beyond what is warranted under the
law. The "girlie-man" reference invokes a recurring skit from
the Saturday Night Live television series pseudo-German ac-
cented "Hans" and "Franz" characters discussing bodybuild-
ing and "pumping up" and denigrating "girlie-men" who do
not meet their masculine standards.'47 As Governor, Schwar-
zenegger himself has made effective use of this "girlie-man"
line to goad California legislators who allegedly were stand-
ing in the way of his populist agenda to reform California
144. Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 4, at 553, n.39.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 555, n.60; Edgell has also sought to obtain a trademark registra-
tion for the "Governor Girlie-Man" mark for use on "plastic toy figurines." See
U.S.P.T.O., Serial No. 78486821, filed September 21, 2004, avalable at
http.//www.uspto.gov.
147. Nicholas, supra note 82 (discussing the "girlie-man" reference as deriv-
ing from an old Saturday Night Live television show skit featuring fictional
bodybuilders who spoke in fake Austrian accents).
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politics and get things done." Although Edgell's "Girlie-
Man" bobblehead is not authorized, and despite significant
nationwide publicity generated by the doll's sales, the ODM
plaintiff has made no efforts to stop sales of the doll.'49 This
failure to assert legal claims against the girlie-man doll sug-
gests that plaintiff recognizes the doll is protected expression
that does not impair Schwarzenegger's rights of publicity,
since if plaintiff truly believed this doll violated legitimate
rights of publicity, it would certainly have taken legal action
to stop its sale. Although the ODM plaintiff was successful in
squelching an image it found unflattering in this recently set-
tled case, it may have at least learned the lesson that such
heavy-handed censorship may not always be as easy to ac-
complish. Plaintiffs failure to assert right of publicity claims
against the girlie-man doll is a tacit admission that there are
no legitimate claims to make. This fact also suggests that the
ODM litigation was not meritorious, but was initiated be-
cause the plaintiff determined its assertion of rights may be
successful anyway.
One lesson from the ODM case is that strategic intellec-
tual property litigation tactics permitted the plaintiff to over-
extend rights of publicity beyond what the law-and likely
most courts-would permit. This suggests that courts should
constrain plaintiffs' ability to engage in strategic intellectual
property litigation in order to enhance the possibilities for
creative expression that uses likenesses of celebrities and (es-
pecially) politicians and thereby also enhance the public do-
main and the free expression of ideas.
Legal scholars and commentators have long suggested
that the over-protection of intellectual property rights by the
courts-including rights of publicity-may have a deleterious
effect on both freedom of speech and on the vibrancy of the
public domain.5 ° But what the ODM case reveals is that
these effects may also result from the private assertion and
settlement of intellectual property disputes in the "shadow of
148. See John M. Broder, Schwarzenegger Calls Budget Opponents "Girlie-
Men,"N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at All.
149. See Victoria Sind Flor, The Arnold Bobblehead is Back [This Time the
Governator is Pretty in Pink], INTELL. PROP. L. & Bus., Dec. 11, 2004, at No. 12.
150. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Ri'ghts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993) (critiquing rights of
publicity and arguing that assertion of these rights threatens to diminish free
expression and facilitate private censorship of important ideas and expression).
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the law," well before a case is fully litigated in court."'
V. CONCLUSION
The courts should have determined that the Schwar-
zenegger bobblehead doll and box constitute "transformative"
expression fully protected by the First Amendment against
the Oak Productions plaintiffs right of publicity claims. The
bobblehead doll and box should also have been found to be a
"fair use" of the Fitness plaintiffs photographs used in the
doll packaging. The settlement of the ODM litigation, which
permits ODM to create a bobblehead doll without a gun, is a
telling admission that Oak Productions' chief goal in the
ODM litigation was to squelch an image it, and its client, did
not like. The settlement outcome also highlights more gener-
ally the significant power often held by right of publicity and
copyright owners to censor disagreeable messages or images
by aggressively asserting even objectively weak intellectual
151. At least one recent case has recognized the power cease-and-desist let-
ters potentially have to censor disagreeable messages that clearly do not violate
legitimate intellectual property interests. See Online Policy Group v. Diebold,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that a cease and desist let-
ter asserting spurious copyright claims was an improper attempt to suppress
content critical of plaintiff corporation warranting award of attorney fees even
where the threatened litigation had never been commenced). There is also
growing literature addressing similar issues of over-enforcement of various in-
tellectual property rights, including rights of publicity. See, e.g., Michael J.
Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003) (arguing that intellectual property owners
may benefit from asserting even objectively weak claims and suggesting sub-
stantive and procedural reform to address the harm produced when such claims
are litigated and settled); Rosemary Coombe, Authorizing the Celebrityv. Public-
ity Rights, Postmodem Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDozO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 365 (1992) (contending that private actors' over-enforcement of
rights of publicity constitutes a major threat to free expression.); Rosemary
Coombe & Andrew Herman, Trademarks, Property and Propriety: The Moral
Economy of Consumer Politics and Corporate Accountability on the Worldwide
Web, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 597 (2000) (discussing how aggressive corporate asser-
tion of trademark and related rights threatens censorship of expression and
ideas); K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking
Confusion Doctrine-Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media
and Cyberspace, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 609 (2004) (discussing the deleteri-
ous social effects of "abusive" and non-meritorious trademark litigation); Sarah
Mayhew Schlosser, The High Price of (Criticizing) Coffee: The Chilling Effect of
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on Corporate Parody, 43 ARIZ L. REV. 931
(2001) (arguing that aggressive private enforcement trademark dilution law
chills free speech aimed at parodying or criticizing corporations.); Ogbu, supra
note 138.
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property claims. The courts should recognize this context and
in future cases establish clearer limits and defenses to both
right of publicity'52 and copyright claims with the goal of en-
couraging creative appropriation and expression that en-
hances the public domain and discouraging strategic intellec-
tual property litigation.
152. California's right of publicity statute, Cal. Civ. Code section 3344(d) ex-
pressly provides for the use of a "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness
in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or
any political campaign . . . ." This article suggests that the express defense to
liability under this statute should not be limited to news, public affairs, or
sports broadcasts or accounts or political campaigns because such a limitation
unduly constrains expressive speech.
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